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Executive Summary  
 
We model and measure the effects of the Northeast Dairy Compact on prices, 
quantities, and producer and consumer welfare, underscoring the distribution of these 
effects across regions and among producer and buyers.  Using 1999 as a base year, 
simulations show that the Compact raised the farm price of milk in the Northeast by 
$0.45/cwt., lowered the farm price of milk in the rest of the country by $0.02/cwt., and 
transferred income from producers outside the Compact region and buyers in the 
Compact region to producers in the Compact region.  Non-Compact producer losses 
exceeded Compact producer gains.  Similar results are found for a scenario of Compact 
contagion—extension of the Compact to include additional states.  In both cases, the 
Compact changed the distribution of the costs and benefits of price discrimination as 
practiced by milk marketing orders.  The implication is that the regional distribution of 
the Compact's welfare effects raises again the question of the organization of a 
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Federal and state regulation has played an important role in the United States 
dairy industry dating back to Depression-era programs.  Program categories include: (i) 
federal and state marketing orders that regulate raw milk prices; (ii) government 
purchases of manufactured dairy products to support the farm price of milk; (iii) import 
barriers for manufactured dairy products; and (since 1985) (iv) export subsidies for 
manufactured dairy products (Benedict; Manchester and Blaney; Manchester; Erba and 
Novakovic; Sumner and Cox).  In addition to these price and quantity regulations, federal 
and state governments also have played an active role in setting food safety and sanitary 
regulations for milk and dairy products.  All of these policy instruments are still in effect 
today, although with modifications. 
The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (hereafter Northeast Compact or 
Compact) added a new element to dairy regulation in the United States.  The Compact 
has potentially important implications for prices, production, and policy in the United 
States, including the pricing of raw milk through the federal milk marketing order 
(FMMO) system.  The Northeast Compact raised the price paid to New England 
producers, thus increasing production of producers in the Compact and lowering the milk 
price received by producers outside the Compact.  In effect, the Compact allowed New 
England producers to increase the benefits they received from the system to the detriment 
of local consumers and of producers in other regions. 
     2 
 
Several authors have examined aspects of the Northeast Compact.  Bailey (2000) 
and the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) used models of price 
discrimination (Parish; Ippolito and Masson) to reason that the Compact would raise 
revenues for Northeast producers and find this reasoning consistent with the data.   
Nicholson, Resosudarmo and Wackernagel provided econometric evidence that the 
Compact encouraged increased milk supply from the Northeast region.  Wackernagel 
used a farm simulation model to show that, by raising the farm price of milk and 
lowering price variability, the Compact improved the financial performance of a 
representative Vermont dairy farm. 
This paper lays out in an explicit and consistent framework the quantitative 
market-level effects of the Northeast Compact on producers and consumers in New 
England
1.  Further, we analyze the Compact’s effects on producers and consumers in the 
rest of the United States.  Unlike previous studies, we model milk supply and demand to 
which FMMO and Compact regulations are applied, and simulate counter-factual 
scenarios against which we measured the Compact’s effect.  This paper goes beyond the 
immediate effects of the current Compact to consider the potential welfare implications 
of what we call Compact contagion—the expansion of the Northeast Compact and the 
formation of new regional dairy compacts, as well as the implications for FMMO 
stability.
                                                 
1 We do not attribute consumer surplus to different groups beyond the farmgate, and 
remain agnostic about the distribution of consumer surplus measures among milk 
processors, retailers, and final consumers.  See Cotterill and Franklin, and Bailey (2001) 




Although the Northeast Compact is no longer in operation, regional dairy 
compacts continue to be proposed as part of future U.S. dairy policy.  Indeed, the 2002 
Farm Bill mandated the USDA to study interstate dairy compacts along with other dairy 
policy instruments (Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002).  Our analysis of 
the Northeast Compact lends insight into the likely effects of further regional dairy 
compacts, and can be extended to model explicitly other dairy compact scenarios.   
Further, our discussion of an expanded Compact and FMMO stability is particularly 
relevant to on-going debate about the pros and cons of regional compacts as dairy policy. 
As expected, and as our analysis shows, Northeast producers—who produce a 
relatively small portion of the country’s milk—have a correspondingly small effect on 
national milk prices.  Nonetheless, the Compact was controversial because (i) its welfare 
effects were distributed unevenly among producers and consumers of different regions, 
and (ii) because it set the precedent for other states to possibly join the Northeast 
Compact or establish new compacts.  We analyze and discuss both of these points.  We 
show that an expanded Compact or more compacts would have greater influence on milk 
markets throughout the country.  Further, we argue that independent, regional 
administration of classified prices by compacts puts pressure on the FMMO system, a 
central part of U.S. dairy regulation for more than 60 years. 
 
A Brief Description of Milk Marketing Orders 
Milk marketing orders use price discrimination to raise the average price received 
by Grade A producers, setting minimum prices that may be paid for Grade A (eligible for 




used in cheese, and milk used in butter and dry milk are set by federal orders according to 
formulae that take into account the wholesale prices of these products.  The minimum 
price for milk used in fluid products in each order is set as a fixed differential over the 
manufacturing-use minimum prices
2.  These administratively determined fluid 
differentials are not uniform across orders, but generally increase with an order’s distance 
from Wisconsin.  Each marketing order pools milk revenues from all end-use classes and 
pays a uniform, market-wide average price to individual farmers delivering milk to that 
order (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service(a), Blaney, Miller 
and Stillman; Erba and Novakovic; Sumner and Cox).  The average, or blend price in any 
order depends not only on the classified prices but also on the utilization rates of the 
various milk classes, which also vary from order to order.  Thus, producer prices vary 
across orders. 
Each federal order is analytically similar to a certain type of cartel, as typically 
considered by economists.  Members of a cartel, such as OPEC, increase profits by 
colluding to limit supplies.  Federal milk marketing orders do not limit total quantity of 
raw milk, but achieve added revenue through price discrimination.  A federal milk 
marketing order raises the price of milk sold for fluid uses.  By raising the fluid milk 
price and pooling revenues from that market with revenues from sales for manufactured 
product uses (for which demand is more elastic), the marketing order reduces fluid sales 
and raises overall production. 
                                                 
2  Although the details of the FMMO pricing rules have changed over time, the key 
element of price discrimination remains; the minimum price for milk used in fluid 
products is set at a premium over the minimum price set for milk used in manufactured 
dairy products.  The changes in FMMO pricing rules do not change this fact, and do not 
change our results or conclusions.  Manchester and Blaney discuss the evolution of the 




The entire FMMO system also can be thought of as a type of “cartel.” By 
establishing the relationship among minimum prices across regions, the FMMO system 
creates a certain distribution of producer benefits among regions (Cox and Chavas).   
Further, by setting different minimum prices (and thus different relative producer 
benefits) in different regions, the FMMO system creates potential for arbitrage, but limits 
arbitrage activity with disincentives to ship milk between regions (Manchester).  This 
system has endured with modifications for more than 60 years in part because 
coordinated administration and enforcement of the classified pricing system has reduced 
independent action by the regional marketing orders. 
Basic economic reasoning and evidence from many industries indicate that 
response to higher prices by individual cartel members makes many such arrangements 
difficult to sustain.  The economics literature of oligopoly refers to analogous behavior of 
cartel members as “cheating” on a cartel (Stigler (1964); Stigler (1975)).  Because 
marketing orders do not control supply, “cheating” in this context takes on a novel form 
that we discuss in a later section. 
Most major milk markets are regulated by the federal system of marketing orders.  
In 1998, about two-thirds of the Grade A milk produced in the country was regulated by 
the FMMO system.  Most of the markets not covered by the federal system belong to a 
state order. California is the most important of the state marketing orders, producing 
about 18% of the country’s Grade A milk.  California’s pricing mechanism differs from 




milk-pricing system also can be described as a government-sponsored cartel
3.  Because it 
is administered independently of the FMMO, the California system does not bear the 
same implications for stability, as we discuss later. 
 
A Brief Description of the Northeast Dairy Compact 
With approval from Congress and the USDA, the state legislatures of New 
England granted the Compact Commission authority to regulate the minimum fluid-use 
(Class I) price within the region starting in July 1997
4.  The Compact’s regulatory rules 
worked in conjunction with the New England FMMO, based in Boston, Massachusetts.  
The Compact set a fixed minimum price (as opposed to a fluid differential) for Class I 
milk sold to processors in New England.  Thus the minimum price for Class I milk in 
those states effectively was the greater of the Compact minimum price or the FMMO 
announced minimum Class I price in the New England order
5.  The Compact did not set 
minimum prices for non-fluid end-use classes.  Congressional authority for the Northeast 
Dairy Compact expired in September 2001.  
The Class I price determined to be acceptable—by two-thirds vote of New 
England state delegations, and by producer referendum—was $16.94 per hundredweight 
                                                 
3 Sumner and Wilson document the development of the California system, and Sumner 
and Wolf model the difference between California and federal milk marketing orders. 
4 The Compact system also passed federal district court challenges brought by processor 
groups in January 1998 and November 1998 (Northeast Dairy Compact Commission). 
5 Federal milk marketing order reform resulted in consolidation and realignment of 
marketing orders starting January 1, 2000, as of which date the FMMO price relevant to 
the Compact is the announced minimum Class I price for the newly formed Northeast 
Order, based in Boston, MA.  Throughout this paper, we describe and model the Compact 
as originally legislated, building from the New England order.  The realignment of 
marketing orders does not change our analysis in an important way, requiring only the 
substitution of the Northeast order’s minimum Class I price for that of the now defunct 




of milk (cwt).  If the FMMO minimum Class I price in a particular month fell below 
$16.94, processors were obligated to pay the difference to the Compact Commission on 
all Class I purchases.  The Commission, in turn, distributed the revenue back to 
producers
6.  For detailed discussion of Compact history and rules, see Bailey (2000), 
Alexander et al., and the Northeast Dairy Compact Commission. 
 
Qualitative Implications for Prices and Welfare 
The Northeast Compact deviated from the pricing rules of the FMMO system for 
milk sold in New England by administering a minimum Class I milk price independent of 
the FMMO pricing system, thereby raising the average producer price for dairy farms 
delivering milk to New England processors.  As a result, fluid milk consumers in those 
states faced higher milk prices.  Dairy farms not selling to New England processors lost, 
since the higher producer price in New England increased milk supply in those states and 
lowered the price of milk for producers throughout the rest of the country. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Compact faced controversy on two fronts.  By 
raising Class I prices, the Compact transferred income from milk consumers to dairy 
farms within New England.  The transfer can also be seen as a payment from relatively 
populous states, such as Massachusetts, to states with many dairy farms, such as 
Vermont.  Indeed, such an interpretation prompted the Massachusetts state legislature to 
consider seriously the possibility of withdrawing from the Compact (Tynan, Clancy). 
                                                 
6 Payments to producers are made only after adjustments are made to reimburse the 
Special Supplemental Food Program for Women Infants and Children (WIC) program, 
school lunch programs, and other government outlays that may increase due to a higher 
milk price caused by the Compact.  In approving the Compact, Congress did not hold the 
Commission responsible for a similar compensation to private consumers of fluid milk.  




The Compact was also controversial because of its effects on milk markets 
outside of the Compact region.  As our results show quantitatively, the Compact raised 
the producer price in New England, which increased milk production from those states.  
Under classified pricing, additional production was allocated to the lower-priced 
manufacturing milk market, resulting in lower minimum class prices and blend prices for 
producers throughout the country.  In the context of the FMMO system as a government-
sponsored “cartel”, the Compact legally evaded the FMMO rules.  The Compact acted as 
a type of cartel within the larger FMMO system (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p.456).  But the 
FMMO system is not the typical, quantity-restricting cartel, and evasion or cartel 
cheating here takes a novel form.  The Compact raised prices in its own region and, thus, 
increased production without regard for those producers outside the Compact who 
received a lower milk price as a result of the increased production. 
Because New England produces a relatively small portion of the country’s milk, 
the Northeast Compact had a relatively small effect on the price of manufacturing milk.  
However, dairy farms in other regions have a similar incentive as New England 
producers to raise Class I prices through regional compacts.  New regional compacts that 
include a larger portion of U.S. milk production would impose even greater costs on fluid 
milk consumers and non-compact producers.  Further, the potential for local 
administration of independent, regional classified prices raises questions about the 
continued sustainability of a nationally coordinated milk marketing system. 
In the next section, we model and measure the effects of the Northeast Compact 




section, we use the model to illustrate the effect of an expanded dairy compact or 
additional regional compacts. 
 
Modeling the Effects of the Compact 
Ippolito and Masson developed a well-known model of FMMO regulation, 
building from Kessel’s model of price discrimination (see also Parish, who precedes this 
literature but applies his model to the Australian case).  As with many intervening articles 
(Blaney, Miller and Stillman; Kwoka; Dahlgran; Cox and Chavas; Sumner and Cox; and 
Sumner and Wolf, among others), we use this general framework to model marketing 
order price regulation.  We use the same model to analyze the Northeast Compact’s 
modification of marketing order regulation, and we compare market equilibrium under 
the two regimes.  We describe the model in this section.  In the next section, we 
parameterize the model and simulate the effects of the Compact. 
We assume for simplicity that the FMMO system distinguishes between only two 
end-use of Grade A milk
7.  Milk used in fluid products is designated Class f, while milk 
used in manufactured products is designated Class m.  Figure 1 depicts the model of the 
New England Grade A milk market.  Due to the cost of shipping fluid milk and FMMO 
regulations that restrict the movement of milk across regions, the demand for Class f milk 
facing New England, Df(Pf), is regional and relatively inelastic.  On the other hand, since 
manufactured dairy products are traded across the United States, New England faces a 
                                                 
7 Marketing orders actually work with three, four or five classes of milk: one for fluid 
uses; two or three for soft products such as cottage cheese or ice cream; and one or two 
for butter, non-fat dry milk, and cheese.  Aggregating all the non-fluid use classes into a 
single class for all manufactured dairy products simplifies the exposition while still 




national demand for milk in manufacturing
8.  Since New England produces only a small 
fraction of the country’s manufacturing milk, the portion of the national demand for Class 
m milk facing New England, Dm(Pm), is relatively elastic.  The supply of Grade A milk in 
New England is labeled Q
S(P) and represents supply from all Grade A producers who 
deliver milk to processors regulated by the New England FMMO (including those 
producers who ship milk into the region from outside of New England). 
In the absence of the Compact, we assume all Grade A milk is sold at the 
minimum prices set by the New England FMMO.  The marketing order sets a fixed fluid 
differential, d, so that the price paid for fluid milk is 
(1)  d P P m f + ≡ . 
We assume that the price paid for manufacturing milk, Pm, is determined in a competitive 
market
9.  Each producer selling milk in this region receives a market-wide average price
10 
determined by 
                                                 
8 Since manufactured dairy products are traded across the country, we use a factor-price 
equalization argument to argue that the price of manufacturing milk is approximately 
equal across the country.  Alternatively, we can argue that the minimum price formulae 
for milk used in cheese and in butter and skim powder are the same across all federal 
orders, so that these prices are equal across regions and highly, positively correlated.  
Further, the California and federal systems use pricing formulae that are based on prices 
for the same, publicly traded dairy products.  In any case, it is at least approximately true 
that there is a single price of manufacturing milk across the country, and this is certainly 
true relative to the wide variation in the price of milk used for fluid products. 
9 In reality, marketing orders set minimum prices for manufacturing milk according to 
formulae that take into account the wholesale prices of manufactured dairy product traded 
in a competitive market.  Our assumption that Pm is set by a competitive market is 
equivalent to assuming that marketing orders set minimum prices that clear markets. 
10 As with the other literature on milk marketing orders, we ignore over-order premiums 
here.  Inclusion of over-order premiums would not change our analysis significantly, and 
the direction of the Compact’s effects would be the same as found here as long as the 
Compact Class f price is set above the price that would have been paid for Class f milk.  
To the extent that over-order premiums are paid in the absence of the Compact, our 






m m f f
m b D D
P D P D











+ = . 
The average, or blend price, represented by the curved line in figure 1, 
asymptotically approaches the aggregate demand curve under the FMMO’s fixed 
differential policy, Df(Pm+d)+Dm(Pm), as Pm falls and an increasing share of milk is sold 
as Class m. 
Equilibrium in this market is determined by the intersection of the blend price 
curve and the supply curve.  Given this quantity supplied, the price for manufacturing 
milk, labeled Pm*, is read off the aggregate demand curve.  The marketing order sets the 
fluid price at Pf*=Pm*+d, at which price fluid demand is Df(Pf*).  The quantity of milk 
sold to the manufacturing market is the difference between supply and fluid demand. 
Unlike the FMMO, the Compact set a fluid price directly (as opposed to setting a 
differential) such that the effective fluid price under the Compact was no lower, and often 
higher, than the price set by the marketing order.  To be effective, the Compact had to 
raise the minimum price of Class f milk and transfer the additional revenues to producers.  
Figure 2 represents the same supply curve and fluid demand curve (those for New 
England) as in figure 1.  The manufacturing demand curve, also the same as in figure 1, is 
omitted for clarity.  However, the aggregate demand curve and blend price curve (in 
bold) corresponding to the Compact’s policy are slightly different.   Subscript c denotes 
equilibrium prices and quantities under the Compact’s policy.  If the Compact sets a 
minimum Class f price at Pc, the effective minimum fluid price for the region becomes 




for milk becomes Df(Pc)+Dm(Pm), where the fluid milk price and quantity demanded are 
now fixed. 
The blend price paid to producers under the Compact’s pricing rule is 
(3)  ()
m f
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which asymptotically approaches the aggregate demand curve under the fixed Class f 
price policy as Pm falls and an increasing share of milk is sold as Class m.  This is similar 
to the case under the FMMO pricing scheme, but, as we just noted, aggregate demand is 
slightly different under the two regimes. 
The arrows in figure 2 indicate the direction of the Compact’s effects on the 
equilibrium prices and quantities in this market, relative to the FMMO equilibrium of 
figure 1.  By raising the minimum fluid class price, the Compact reduces Class f sales.  
The blend price line thus shifts upward under the Compact rules, intersecting the supply 
schedule at a higher price than the FMMO blend price.  The higher blend price 
encourages an expansion in the milk supply along the supply schedule.  With more milk 
supplied and less milk used in Class f, the supply of Class m milk from New England 
expands relative to the FMMO equilibrium, lowering the price for manufacturing milk. 
By raising the blend price in the Compact region, the Compact raises the revenues 
of New England dairy farms (and of other farms that ship milk to Compact region 
handlers).  Additional producer revenues come at the expense of fluid milk consumers, 
who pay higher milk prices.  The additional loss in fluid milk consumer surplus due to 
the Compact can be seen in figure 2 as the area to the left of the fluid demand curve, and 




The Compact’s effects on producers and consumers in other regions work through 
the price of manufacturing milk.  If New England produces and sells more milk on the 
manufacturing market, the prices of manufactured dairy products and the price for Class 
m milk throughout the country are driven lower
11.  Class f prices in other marketing 
orders also decrease due to the Class m-plus-differential formula used to obtain Class f 
minimum prices.  Milk supply in non-Compact regions contracts due to lower producer 
prices
12.  On the other hand, consumers of manufactured dairy products, and consumers 
of fluid milk outside of the Compact enjoy lower prices. 
The Compact’s effects on producers and consumers outside of the Compact 
region depends on Compact producers’ ability to affect the prices in the manufacturing 
milk market.  If the Compact’s share of the manufacturing market had grown—either 
through expansion of the Northeast Compact to include more states or through the 
formation of new regional dairy compacts—the effect on national milk prices would have 
been larger. 
In the following section, we parameterize the model and estimate the Compact’s 
effect on prices, quantities, and producer and consumer welfare.  In a later section, we 
explore the effects that a Compact that would include a larger share of national milk 
production. 
 
                                                 
11 If minimum prices for manufacturing class milk are at or below support prices, 
additional sales of milk on the manufacturing market could result in government 
purchases of manufactured products.  We ignore government purchases in this paper.   
12 The lower manufacturing price has a similar effect on producers of manufacturing 
grade (Grade B) milk, including those located within the Northeast region, since Grade B 
and Class m milk are substitutes in manufactured dairy products.  This also applies to 




Measuring Policy Incidence 
Like previous users of similar models (Ippolito and Masson; Blaney, Miller, and 
Stillman; Kwoka; Dahlgran; Cox and Chavas; Sumner and Cox; and Sumner and Wolf), 
we assume locally linear supply and demand throughout the paper.  Our results would be 
similar under a constant elasticity or other functional form specification.  Our 
methodology is as follows: 
1.  Use public data collected under the Compact regime and elasticities from 
previous studies to parameterize the New England milk supply curve, the New 
England fluid milk demand curve, and the share of the national demand curve 
for manufacturing milk facing New England. 
2.  Using these supply and demand curves, simulate the equilibrium for the 
counter-factual scenario in which milk is priced according to the FMMO 
pricing rules in the absence of the Compact. 
3.  Compare prices, quantities, and welfare under the two regimes. 
4.  Consider the influence of parameter choices through sensitivity analysis (see 
appendix). 
We parameterize the linear supply and demand model of figure 2 using annual 
milk marketing data and supply and demand elasticities drawn from the agricultural 
economics literature.  We use 1999 as a base year for our simulations.
13  Our data consist 
of annual quantities and annual average prices of Class I milk and all milk published by 
USDA and the Compact Commission.  Data for the Compact region and the entire 
                                                 
13 The specific numerical results depend on our choice of base year.  We use the most 
recent data available at the time of writing.  The Compact played less of a role in 1998 
due to higher FMMO prices.  Thus, had we used 1998 as a base year, the effects of the 




FMMO system are included in table 1.  The annual average Compact fluid premium is 
$1.20/cwt.  That is, the Compact raised the Class I price in New England by $1.20/cwt. 
relative to the announced FMMO Class I price.  We impute the average manufacturing 
milk price from equation (2a), given the announced blend and minimum Class I prices, 
the quantity of Class I milk sold, and total milk marketed.  We calculate the FMMO 
differential as the average FMMO Class I price less the imputed average manufacturing 
price.  These data give us an observation on the fluid demand curve, one on the supply 
curve (which is also on the blend price curve), and another on the manufacturing demand 
curve. 
A range of raw milk supply elasticities can be found in the agricultural economics 
literature.  We consider an intermediate time horizon of 3 to 6 years to allow for 
adjustments in milk production through managed changes in herd size and productivity in 
response to an expected, permanent change in the relative price of milk.  Chavas and 
Klemme estimated supply elasticity to range from 0.22 to 1.17 for this time frame.  Cox 
and Chavas specify their model with supply elasticity of 0.37.  Ippolito and Masson used 
estimates of 0.4 to 0.9 in their work.  Helmberger and Chen estimated the “long run” milk 
supply elasticity to be 0.583, and Chen, Courtney and Schmitz estimated a supply 
elasticity of 2.53.  We choose a supply elasticity of 1.0, which is well within the range of 
estimates found in prior studies. 
The milk demand elasticities used to parameterize the model are also drawn from 
the agricultural economics literature.  Estimates of the long run demand elasticity for 
fluid class milk range from -0.34 (Ippolito and Masson) to -0.076 (Helmberger and 




(Helmberger and Chen; Dahlgran) to -0.2 (Ippolito and Masson).  Heien and Wessells 
estimated own-price elasticities of -0.63 for retail demand for milk, -0.52 for cheese and -
0.73 for butter.  Huang estimated own-price elasticities of -0.26 for retail demand for 
milk, -0.33 cheese and -0.17 butter.  We assume that the elasticity of the national demand 
for manufacturing milk (at the farm level) is -0.2.  We also assume a regional fluid 
demand elasticity of -0.2.  Both of these are within the range of estimates found in prior 
studies. 
Our numerical results depend on our choice of supply and demand elasticity 
values.  In the appendix, we examine the sensitivity of our results to our assumptions on 
supply and demand elasticities.  We find that our results do not vary greatly over a 
reasonable range of parameter values. 
Following Ippolito and Masson, we calculate the elasticity of demand for 
manufacturing milk facing New England producers as 











 − + η = η , 
where  i η  is the demand elasticity in i (i = New England, United States);  ROC ε  is the 
milk supply elasticity from all U.S. producers less New England; and s is New England’s 
share of U.S. manufacturing milk production.  In 1999, the New England states supplied 
only 3% of the U.S. manufacturing milk.  Given a supply elasticity of 1.0 and a national 
demand elasticity of -0.2, the elasticity of demand for manufacturing milk facing the 
Northeast is -39.  Manufacturing milk demand facing New England is very elastic 
because New England produces such a small portion of the nation’s manufacturing milk.  
Although figures 1 and 2 focus attention on the New England milk market, the effects of 




of the demand for manufacturing milk.  In our model, price changes along the 
manufacturing milk demand curve facing New England (depicted in figures 1 and 2) 
represent changes in the national price for manufacturing milk. 
Using the data (table 1) to anchor our supply and demand curves, the elasticities 
we choose imply the following (locally) linear specifications of the supply and demand 
curves: 
New England milk supply: Q
S(P) = 4.3390P; 
New England inverse fluid demand: Pf(Qf) = 108.60 – 3.0046Qf; 
New England inverse manufacturing demand: Pm(Qm) = 13.5221 – 0.0092Qm. 
We simulate the equilibrium for the No-Compact scenario by applying the FMMO price 
discrimination policy (figure 1) to the market defined by these supply and demand 
equations.  The No-Compact equilibrium is found as the intersection of the supply curve 
and the blend price curve, given a fluid differential of $3.72/cwt. (imputed from the data 
in table 1). 
Table 2 compares the simulated equilibrium prices, quantities and welfare 
measures under the No-Compact scenario to those observed under the Compact regime.  
The higher fluid class price paid under the Compact rules raises the producer blend price 
in New England by $0.447/cwt., encouraging more production and raising producer 
revenues.  New England producers gain $29.4 million as a result of the Compact.  The 
Compact raises the price of fluid milk in New England by $1.180, resulting in a loss in 




reduced fluid consumption, New England expands manufacturing class sales causing a 
$0.022 or 0.2 percent fall in the price of that milk
14. 
The difference between the gain in producer surplus and the loss in New England 
fluid consumer surplus does not equal deadweight loss because the Compact affects 
producers and consumers outside of New England by lowering the price for 
manufacturing milk.  Producers delivering to other marketing orders also receive a blend 
price as described previously in equation (2b).  We can express the blend price in a single 
order, i, equivalently as 
(5)  () () i i m i m i m bi d d ; P s P d ; P P + = , 
where si(Pm;di) is the fluid class utilization rate, or the share of total production in region i 
used in fluid products.  From equation (5), the marginal effect of the manufacturing milk 

















Because manufacturing milk demand is more elastic than fluid demand, the 
derivative of si with respect to Pm is positive; for a given fall in the price of 
manufacturing milk, manufacturing quantity demanded rises by a greater amount than 
                                                 
14 The Northeast Compact eventually instituted a complex supply tax and redistribution 
scheme.  Starting in July 2000, $0.075 per cwt. of all Class I milk was withheld from the 
Compact’s revenues and paid into an escrow fund.  These funds were then paid back to 
producers who increased production by no more than one percent of the previous year’s 
production.  Half of the fund was distributed uniformly to all eligible producers, 
regardless of an individual farm’s level of production.  The other half was paid to eligible 
producers on a per hundredweight basis (Northeast Dairy Compact Commission; Bailey 
(2000)).  The scheme does not guarantee success in preventing growth in milk 
production.  If the minimum fluid price set by the Compact is more than $0.075 greater 
than the minimum FMMO price, some producers will find it profitable to increase 
production under the Compact.  Moreover, the supply management mechanism 
introduces yet another distortion, giving perverse incentives to Compact dairy farms by 




does fluid quantity demanded, causing the fluid utilization rate to fall.  Thus, a fall in Pm 
due to the Compact causes the blend price in other federal orders to fall by more than the 
change in Pm.  But for small changes in the manufacturing milk price we can ignore the 









Thus, to a very close approximation, the fall in the manufacturing milk price due to the 
Compact translates into fall of the same magnitude in the blend price received by 
producers in other regions. 
The effects of lower manufacturing milk prices on producers outside the Compact 
region (who do not deliver milk to New England) are presented in table 3.  To highlight 
the interests of producers in various regions, we show losses to producers in California, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota,
15 as well as the effect on all producers outside the Compact 
region.  We assume a supply elasticity of 1.0 in each state.  From equation (7), the $0.022 
drop in the price of manufacturing milk causes a $0.022 drop in blend prices throughout 
the country.  As a result, non-Compact producers lose $33.7 million in producer surplus. 
The lower manufacturing milk price benefits consumers of that milk.  Consumers 
of manufacturing milk, who accounted for 1,070 million cwt. of milk in 1999, gained 
about $23.1 million in consumer surplus thanks to the lower manufacturing price due to 
                                                 
15 California’s milk pricing policy is different than the FMMO system (see California 
Department of Food and Agriculture, and Sumner and Wolf).  However, the formulae 
used to set minimum prices for manufacturing milk in California, like those for the 
FMMO system, are based on the prices of publicly traded manufactured dairy products.  
Further, the formula used to set fluid class prices in California is approximately equal to 
the fixed differential formula used by the FMMO.  Thus, in measuring the effects of the 





the Compact.  Consumers of fluid milk outside the Compact region also gained from a 
lower manufacturing milk price.  Because of the fixed differential policy, the price of 
fluid milk falls by the same amount as the change in the price of manufacturing milk 
($0.022).  Non-Compact producers sold about 527 million cwt. of milk to the fluid 
market (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service (a), (b)).  Thus, 
fluid milk consumers outside of New England gained about $11.4 million in consumer 
surplus thanks to lower fluid milk prices due to the Compact. 
The net effect of the Compact on producers and consumers throughout the United 
States is the sum of the welfare effects reported in tables 2 and 3.  Again, Compact 
producers gain $29.4 million and non-Compact producers lose $33.7 million, thus, 
interestingly, producers as a nation-wide group lose $4.2 million.  Fluid consumers in the 
Compact region lose $35.8 million, those outside the Compact region gain $11.4 million, 
and manufacturing consumers gain $23.1 million; consumers as a group lose $1.3 
million.  The deadweight cost of the Compact is $5.6 million. 
Our results are consistent with those of previous studies.  Bailey (2000) assumes a 
Compact premium of $2 per cwt. and finds slightly larger effects on milk prices, although 
in the same direction as our results.  Our results are qualitatively similar to those found 
by the Office of Management and Budget for an earlier period, and are consistent with 
those of Nicholson, Resosudarmo and Wackernagel who provide empirical evidence that 
the growth in New England production is linked to the higher producer price due to the 
Compact.  Moreover, our welfare analysis makes explicit the income transfers caused by 
the Compact.  The Compact makes New England producers better off at the expense of 




transfers income from New England fluid milk consumers and from producers in the rest 
of the country to New England producers and consumers in the rest of the country. 
 
Compact Contagion 
Compact contagion refers to the potential growth of the dairy compact movement. 
Six additional states were eligible to join the Northeast Compact, conditional on 
Congressional consent and the stipulation that a state be contiguous to the current 
Compact region at the time of their entry. New York, New Jersey and Maryland were 
approved participation in the Compact, but still needed Congressional approval.   
Legislation to join the Compact was introduced in the Pennsylvania House and Senate.  
Compact growth may also come in the form of new compacts formed in other regions of 
the country.  Ten southern states have already approved the formation of a Southern 
Dairy Compact that could stretch from Kansas to Virginia, and from Texas to Florida.  
States in the West and Midwest have also shown some interest in forming similar 
agreements (Northeast Dairy Compact Commission).  In all of these cases, Congressional 
approval is necessary for the formation of an interstate compact.  Although the 2002 
Farm Bill did not grant continued approval to the Northeast Compact, it did mandate the 
study of compacts, suggesting that regional compacts are among the set of policy 
instruments from which future of U.S. dairy regulation will be formed. 
Regional compacts that include a larger share of the nation’s milk production—
and more specifically, the nation’s milk sold for manufacturing uses—will have a greater 
effect on the national manufacturing milk price.  In our model, equation (4) captures this 




manufacturing milk demand facing the Compact becomes less elastic, thus increasing the 
price effect of a given expansion in Compact manufacturing milk sales on the national 
market. 
To illustrate, we simulate the effects of adding New York and New Jersey to the 
Northeast Compact.  The methodology is similar to steps (1) through (4) in the previous 
section, only here we specify the supply and demand curves of the New York-New Jersey 
(NY-NJ) federal marketing order, then simulate the effects of adding NY-NJ to the 
Compact.  We then consider the price, quantity, and welfare effects of this policy relative 
to the (observed) scenario in which only New England is included in the Compact. 
The 1999 data for the NY-NJ federal marketing order are listed in the “No 
Contagion” column of table 4.  These data reflect the pricing rules of the NY-NJ 
marketing order, as well as the effects of the original Northeast Compact analyzed in the 
previous section.  The NY-NJ order regulated the sale of 116.61 million cwt. of raw milk, 
of which 69.92 million cwt. were used in manufacturing.  NY-NJ accounts for about six 
percent of the country’s manufacturing milk, almost twice New England’s share of 
manufacturing milk. 
We assume the Compact raises the monthly minimum Class I price in NY-NJ to 
$16.40, the Compact’s minimum Class I price in New England.  The minimum Class I 
price announced by the NY-NJ federal order was less than $16.40 during six months in 
1999, such that the Compact minimum would have raised the annual average Class I 
price in the region from $16.82 to $17.78.  We assume a fluid demand elasticity of -0.2, 
national manufacturing demand elasticity of -0.2, and supply elasticity of 1.0, the same 




manufacturing demand elasticity facing NY-NJ is -19.  The resulting linear 
approximations to the NY-NJ supply and demand curves are: 
NY-NJ milk supply: Q
S(P) = 7.9327P; 
NY-NJ inverse fluid demand: Pf(Qf) = 100.92 – 1.8012Qf; 
NY-NJ inverse manufacturing demand: Pm(Qm) = 13.9835 – 0.0100Qm. 
The prices and quantities resulting from raising the fluid class price to $17.78 are 
reported in table 4 in the column labeled “Contagion.”  Table 4 compares the effects of 
adding NY-NJ to the Compact relative to the prices, quantities and welfare resulting from 
the New England-only Compact regime
16.  Expansion of the Compact to include NY-NJ 
raises the price of fluid milk in that region, resulting in a reduction in fluid consumption 
and a welfare loss of $44.6 million to fluid milk consumers in NY-NJ.  The expanded 
Compact raises the NY-NJ blend price by $0.310/cwt. and NY-NJ producers gain $36.5 
million in producer surplus.  The pattern of welfare costs and benefits within NY-NJ is 
similar to that found for the New England states in table 2.  However, because NY-NJ 
accounts for almost twice as much production and fluid consumption as New England, 
the magnitude of the welfare effects is larger in NY-NJ even though the expanded 
Compact has a smaller effect on Class I and blend prices in NY-NJ than the original 
Compact has in New England. 
The size of the NY-NJ region also translates into larger effects on the rest of the 
country through a larger effect on the price of manufacturing milk.  NY-NJ producers sell 
                                                 
16 The model, data, and parameter values used to analyze the effects of Compact 
expansion are consistent with the model, data, and parameters used to analyze the 
original Compact.  Thus, the sum of the welfare effects in tables (2) through (5) is 
equivalent to the welfare effect of a Compact that includes both New England and NY-




an additional 3 million cwt. of manufacturing milk due to expansion of the Compact.  
This additional manufacturing milk lowers the national manufacturing milk price by 
$0.029/cwt., resulting in a fall in class and blend prices in other regions by approximately 
the same amount.  Table 5 presents the effects on the rest of the country of adding NY-NJ 
to the Compact relative to the New England-only regime.  Producers in California, who 
lose $6.6 million due to the original Compact (table 3), lose an additional $9 million 
when the Compact includes NY-NJ.  Similar results hold for producers in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota.  Producers in New England also lose due to the addition of NY-NJ to the 
Compact, but the blend price in New England falls by less than the $0.029 since the 
Compact fixes the fluid price in that region.  The decrease in the price of manufacturing 
milk only affects the 55 percent of New England’s milk sold on the manufacturing 
market, resulting in a fall in New England’s blend price of $0.016.  New England 
producers, who gain $29.4 million by joining the Compact, lose $1.4 million due to the 
addition of NY-NJ to the Compact.  Producers outside of NY-NJ but including New 
England, lose $43.6 million.  Producers as a nation-wide group, who lose $4.2 million 
due to the original Compact, lose an additional $7.1 million due to “contagion” of the 
Compact to NY-NJ. 
Fluid consumers outside the NY-NJ region gain an additional $13.9 million in 
consumer surplus.  U.S. manufacturing milk consumers gain $31.6 million in consumer 
surplus due to the expanded Compact.  As a nation-wide group, consumers of all dairy 
products, who lose $1.3 million due to the original Compact, gain almost $1 million due 




The deadweight cost of the original Compact is $5.6 million.  Compact 
“contagion” to NY-NJ generates an additional deadweight cost of $6.2 million.  Since the 
net effect on consumers is small, most of the net welfare loss comes from producers.  
Non-Compact producer losses exceed Compact producer gains, so that the Compact 
actually makes U.S. dairy farms worse off. 
The income transfers induced by the Compact change the regional distribution of 
costs and benefits of price discrimination.  Producers within the Compact benefit at the 
expense of local consumers and all other producers.  Expansion of the Compact to 
additional states benefits producers in those states at the expense of local fluid consumers 
and all other producers, including those who are already in the Compact.  In the next 
section, we discuss some implications of the Compact’s distributional effects. 
 
Federal Milk Marketing Order Stability 
The emergence of regional compacts in U.S. dairy policy raises questions about 
the organization of the FMMO system.  How would independent administration of 
regional classified prices affect the FMMO system? 
A challenge for the typical, supply-limiting cartel is to enforce supply controls 
despite incentives created by the cartel for individual members to increase production 
(Stigler 1964).  In the case of the U.S. dairy industry, the FMMO has served as enforcer 
of an implicit agreement among dairy farms across the country regarding how milk prices 
should be set in the various regions of the country.  The terms of trade set and enforced 
by the FMMO system for each order determine the distribution of the benefits and costs 




Chavas).  The commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution puts clear limits on the authority 
of individual states or groups of states to operate regional compacts.  The Compact 
threatened FMMO stability by permitting producers in individual regions to legally 
deviate from the implicit agreement to which non-Compact producers adhere, ignoring 
the consequences for producers outside their region, and upsetting the distribution of 
benefits resulting from FMMO policies.  New regional compacts would have the same 
destabilizing effect on the FMMO. 
Dairy farms in regions that determine and enforce their own regional prices may 
not suffer from the breakdown of the FMMO system.  But federal enforcement and 
coordination of the milk marketing system are lost in such a scenario.  Each individual 
regional compact could adjust classified prices strategically in order to raise local 
producer revenue at the expense of local consumers and producers in other regions.  One 
possible result of this competition is that producers in regions with lower fluid utilization 
rates (i.e., those who benefit the least from the FMMO system) will withdraw from the 
federal system.  This is exactly what the Upper Midwest producers and their political 




The Northeast Dairy Compact raised milk prices for those producers whose milk 
it regulated, creating for them additional producer surplus at the expense of fluid milk 
consumers in the Compact region and producers not delivering milk to New England.  




an expansion in the New England milk supply.  Private consumers paid more for fluid 
milk in the Compact region, and thus reduced consumption.  Additional manufacturing 
milk marketed by Compact producers lowered the average price for that milk by 
$0.022/cwt., resulting in a loss for producers and a gain for consumers in all other 
regions. 
In giving the New England states authority to form the Compact, Congress 
allowed them to act collectively to regulate the interstate commerce of milk.  States in 
other regions were poised to join the Compact or form additional regional compacts.  For 
the past 60 years, the Federal milk marketing order system has determined the regional 
pattern of milk prices in much of the country, preserving those terms of trade by 
providing disincentives to ship milk across regions.  By setting up a separate Compact, 
the New England states put pressure on the federal system by increasing the benefits its 
producers received from price discrimination relative to producers in other regions in the 
federal system.  By lowering the milk price for non-Compact producers, the Compact 
raised the incentive for producers in other regions to form similar pricing arrangements. 
Multiple regional compacts, which continue to be considered for U.S. dairy 
policy, would regulate a larger share of U.S. milk than did the Northeast Compact.  The 
clear losers would be private consumers of fluid milk in any compact region, and 
producers not delivering to compact regions.  Moreover, the compact movement raises 
again the question of the organization of a government-sponsored milk marketing plan.  
Independent, regional administration of regulated milk prices threatens the continued 




Thus, the Northeast Compact had implications beyond its immediate effects on 
consumers and producers across the country.  This paper brings these to light, and 
illustrates a methodology that can be extended to analyze milk markets under various 
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We examined our simulation results for sensitivity to our assumptions on supply 
and demand elasticities.  The table below shows the change in the national manufacturing 
price due to the Compact (without NY-NJ) under a range of supply, fluid demand and 
manufacturing demand elasticities that can be found in the literature.  The elasticity of 
manufacturing demand facing New England (in parentheses) is calculated using equation 
(4), given that New England produces three percent of the country’s manufacturing milk. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis. Change in the manufacturing milk price due to the Compact ($/cwt.) 
    New England Supply Elasticity 
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Table 1. Prices and quantities used in base year simulations (1999) 
  New England  All FMMO 
 $/cwt. 
Avg announced FMMO Class 1 price  16.90  16.24 
Avg Compact Class 1 price  18.10  - 
Avg Compact fluid premium  1.20  - 
Avg blend price  15.40
1 14.09 
Avg manufacturing price
2 (imputed)  13.18  12.45 
Avg FMMO fluid differential (imputed)  3.72  3.79 
 Million  cwt. 
Total milk marketed  66.82  1,044.79 
Total Class 1 milk  30.12  452.16 
Total manufacturing milk  36.70  592.63 
Source: USDA-NASS (a and b), Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact Commission 
1.  Includes Compact payment of $0.49/cwt. (= $1.20(Class I sales)/(Total sales) – 
adjustments for WIC, etc.). 
 
2.  The average price of manufacturing milk in the Compact regions is higher than that of 
the FMMO due to a higher rate of utilization of milk in manufacturing classes with 
relatively high prices.  The minimum price for each manufacturing class varies little, 
if at all, across regions, and the average price of manufacturing milk is highly 
positively correlated across regions due to the formulae used to calculate minimum 




Table 2. Effects of the Northeast Dairy Compact on New England producers and 
consumers
1 
  No Compact  Compact  Change  % change 
Prices  ($/cwt.)      
   Fluid class  16.920  18.100  1.180  7.0 
   Manufacturing class  13.206  13.184  -0.022  -0.2 
   Blend price  14.953  15.400  0.447  3.0 
      
Quantities (million cwt.)         
   Fluid class  30.51  30.12  -0.39  -1.3 
   Manufacturing class  34.37  36.70  2.33  6.8 
   Total  64.88  66.82  1.94  3.0 
      
Welfare
2  ($million)      
   Compact producers
3    29.43  3.0 
   Compact fluid consumers
4    -35.77  -6.9 
1.  1999 base year. 
2.  The difference between gains in producer surplus and losses in fluid consumer 
surplus is not deadweight loss because of the Compact’s effects on producers and 
consumers outside the Compact region.  We calculate these effects in table 3. 
3.  Percentage change is change in producer surplus as a share of revenue. 




Table 3. Effects of the Compact on the rest of the Country
1 
 No  Compact
2  Compact change  %change 
        
California        
   Blend price ($/cwt.)  13.472  13.45  -0.022  -0.16 
   Production (million cwt.)  304.57  304.08  -0.49  -0.16 
   Producer surplus ($million)      -6.56   
Wisconsin        
   Blend price  13.882  13.86  -0.022  -0.16 
   Production  228.34  227.99  -0.35  -0.16 
   Producer surplus       -4.92   
Minnesota        
   Blend price  14.012  13.99  -0.022  -0.15 
   Production  93.87  93.73  -0.14  -0.15 
   Producer surplus       -2.02   
U.S. except New England         
   Blend price  14.358  14.34  -0.022  -0.15 
   Production  1,562.63  1,560.29  -2.34  -0.15 
   Producer surplus       -33.67   
   Fluid consumer surplus
3 ($million)    11.36   
U.S. manufacturing consumer surplus
4 ($million)  23.08   
1.  1999 base year. 
 
2.  We simulate the No Compact scenario by raising class prices and producer prices by 
$0.022 (see table 2). 
 
 
3.  Fluid use in the United States was 556.74 million cwt. in 1999.  We subtract New 
England fluid use of 30.12 million cwt. (table 2) to get non-Compact fluid 
consumption of 526.63 million cwt. 
 





Table 4. Effects on NY-NJ producers and consumers of adding NY-NJ to the 
Compact
1 
 No  Contagion  Contagion  Change  %change 
Prices ($/cwt.)         
   Fluid class  16.820  17.780  0.960  5.7 
   Manufacturing class
2  13.284 13.255  -0.029  -0.2 
   Blend price  14.700  15.010  0.310  2.1 
        
Quantities (million cwt.)         
   Fluid class  46.69  46.16  -0.53  -1.1 
   Manufacturing class  69.92  72.90  2.98  4.3 
   Total  116.61  119.06  2.45  2.1 
        
Welfare
2 ($million)         
NY-NJ producer
3     36.53  2.1 
NY-NJ fluid consumer
4        -44.57  -5.7 
1.  1999 base year. 
 
2.  The difference between gains in producer surplus and losses in fluid consumer 
surplus is not deadweight loss because of Compact’s effects on producers and 
consumers outside the Compact region.  We calculate these effects in table 5. 
 
 
3.  Percentage change is change in producer surplus as a share of revenue. 
 




Table 5. Effects on the rest of the Country of adding NY-NJ to the Compact
1 
 No  Contagion  Contagion  Change  %change 
       
California       
   Blend price ($/cwt.)  13.450  13.421  -0.029  -0.22 
   Production (million cwt.)  304.08  303.41  -0.667  -0.22 
   Producer surplus ($ million)    -8.96   
Wisconsin       
   Blend price  13.860  13.831  -0.029  -0.21 
   Production  227.99  227.50  -0.485  -0.21 
   Producer surplus      -6.72   
Minnesota       
   Blend price  13.990  13.961  -0.029  -0.21 
   Production  93.73  93.53  -0.198  -0.21 
   Producer surplus      -2.76   
New  England       
   Blend price  15.4  15.384  -0.016  -0.11 
   Production  66.82  66.75  -0.070  -0.11 
   Producer surplus      -1.08   
U.S. except NY-NJ
3       
   Blend price  14.355  14.326  -0.029  -0.21 
   Production  1,510.50  1507.40  -3.103  -0.21 
   Producer surplus      -43.61   
   Fluid consumer surplus
4 ($ million)    13.87   
U.S. manufacturing consumer surplus
5 ($million)  31.57   
1.  1999 base year. 
 
2.  We calculate the effect of NY-NJ on the New England blend price as $0.029 times 
0.55, the share of New England’s milk sold to manufacturing uses. 
 
 
3.  Including New England.  Since New England produces less than five percent of non-
NY-NJ production, the smaller effect on the New England blend price lowers the 
effect on all non-NY-NJ producers by less than one-tenth of a cent. 
 
4.  Fluid use in the United States was 556.74 million cwt. in 1999.  Fluid consumers 
within the Compact do not benefit from lower prices.  Thus, we subtract New 
England fluid use of 30.12 and NY-NJ fluid use of 46.69 million cwt. (table 2) to get 
non-Compact fluid consumption of 479.94 million cwt. 
 
 
5.  Consumption of manufacturing milk in the United States was 1,070.36 million cwt. in 
1999. 
 